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ESSAY 
“TERRORISTIC THREATS” AND COVID-19:  
A GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED 
CHAD FLANDERS,† COURTNEY FEDERICO, ERIC HARMON AND LUCAS 
KLEIN†† 
The first few months of the COVID-19 outbreak in the United States saw the 
rise of a troubling sort of behavior: people would cough or spit on people or otherwise 
threaten to spread the COVID-19 virus, resulting in panic and sometimes thousands 
of dollars in damages to businesses. Those who have been caught have been charged 
under so-called “terroristic threat” statutes. But what is a terroristic threat, and is it 
an appropriate charge in these cases? Surprisingly little has been written about these 
statutes despite their long history and frequent use by states.	Our Essay is one of the 
first to look systematically at these statutes, and we do so in light of the rash of these 
charges during the ongoing pandemic. 
Our argument begins with the premise that these statutes typically contemplate a 
“core case” of terroristic threatening, e.g., someone calls in a bomb threat which forces 
the evacuation of a building.	But these statutes have been variously revised and 
repurposed over the years, most recently to mass shootings. The recent COVID-19 
prosecutions, however, involve facts that are so far outside the “core case,” that even if 
terroristic threatening is a permissible charge in these cases, it is often not the most 
appropriate one. We conclude by suggesting that in many of the COVID-19 cases, other 
charges should be made (such as criminal mischief, disorderly conduct, false reporting, 
etc.) instead of terroristic threatening, and that a lot of the expressive and deterrence 
benefits of more serious charges can be accomplished just as well by social disapproval. 
 
 
 
† Chad Flanders is a professor at Saint Louis University School of Law. 
†† Courtney Federico, Eric Harmon, and Lucas Klein are second-year students at Saint Louis 
University School of Law. Thank you to Joe Welling and Dana Mulhauser for comments on an earlier draft. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The spread of the COVID-19 virus has seen a rise in charges of so-called 
“terroristic threats.”1 The conduct which has led to these charges fits a similar 
pattern: a person coughs on something, or licks something, or says something, 
and in doing so they imply (explicitly or implicitly) that they are COVID-19 
positive.2 In some cases, stores have had to be evacuated and sterilized as a 
result; in others, thousands of dollars of groceries have been thrown out. 
Charges of terroristic threatening have now been brought in several states—
a few states have multiple cases3—and some of the early cases have received 
rather sensationalized national media attention.4 A Department of Justice 
memorandum on March 24, 2020 counseled law enforcement officials that as 
 
1 For a good survey of these cases, see Carlie Porterfield, Why Spitters Could Be Charged as 
Terrorists Because of the Coronavirus, FORBES (Mar. 31, 2020, 1:21 PM) https://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/carlieporterfield/2020/03/31/coronavirus-spitters-could-be-charged-as-terrorists---heres-why/#1bc4 
221a79c2 [https://perma.cc/NFY3-HKYU]. 
2 See infra Part II (discussing four recently charged cases of “terroristic threats”). 
3 New Jersey seems to have taken an especially aggressive tack, with one news story claiming over 
thirty individuals had been charged with making terroristic threats as of April 29, 2020. José Sepulveda, 
Here’s Why Coronavirus Is Being Classified as a Biological Agent, CNBC (Apr. 29, 2020, 11:12 AM) 
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/29/law-enforcement-officials-characterize-covid-19-as-biological-
agent.html [https://perma.cc/R8A7-JTTK]. 
4 See, e.g., Audra D. S. Burch, Coronavirus Misbehavior: When Was Licking a Toilet Ever a Good Idea? N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 1, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/01/us/coronavirus-terrorist-threat-felony.html 
[https://perma.cc/ERZ3-Y22W]; Chelsea Janes, Coughing ‘Attacks’ May Be Prosecuted as Terrorism in War on 
Coronavirus, WASH. POST, (Apr. 8, 2020, 6:13 PM) https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-
science/coughing-attacks-may-be-prosecuted-as-terrorism-in-war-on-coronavirus/2020/04/08/b97d7f9a-
790d-11ea-9bee-c5bf9d2e3288_story.html [https://perma.cc/T83C-HL5N]. 
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COVID-19 “appears to meet” the statutory definition of a biological agent, 
threats to spread the virus could fall under federal terrorism-related statutes.5 
What exactly does it mean to make a “terroristic threat”? While it is 
beyond dispute that threats to infect others with a deadly virus should be 
taken seriously, does the behavior rise to the level where we should equate 
those acts with terrorism?6 This Essay aims to contextualize the recent rise in 
the use of terroristic threat charges, especially at the state level. Most states 
have such statutes (they are not new); they have been variously applied—even 
repurposed—over the years to fit emerging crises, whether they be 
international terrorism, mass shootings, or even the intentional or reckless 
spread of HIV. The application of terroristic threat charges to threats of 
spreading COVID-19 does not, therefore, present an entirely novel 
development. And one can certainly understand the need to send a strong 
message that such foolish and dangerous behavior (like videotaping oneself 
licking deodorant sticks) cannot be tolerated and will be prosecuted. At the 
same time, we can question whether the statutes represent the most 
appropriate charges in every case. 
This Essay proceeds in three parts. In Part I, we present a broad overview 
of the statutes criminalizing terroristic threats in many of the states in the 
U.S. The story we tell goes like this: there is something resembling a core set 
of cases that terroristic threat statutes were designed to cover. These cases 
involve credible threats of great harm (usually involving the use of a weapon) 
directed against a sizeable number of people and result in serious public 
inconvenience (evacuation of a building is one of the most commonly cited 
examples). The punishment for violations of these statutes is, accordingly, 
quite severe. These statutes were passed or refined (if statutes were already 
in place), in response to perceived threats of terrorism and massive public 
disruption—whether this be the international terroristic acts of September 
11, 2001, or the rise of domestic terrorism, i.e. mass shootings. For the most 
part, the statutes (especially in the first degree) fit these later crises because 
they were sufficiently close to the “core set” of cases to which the statutes 
were a response. That is, threats of mass shootings and (obviously) threats of 
terrorisms were properly charged as “terroristic.” One major exception to this 
rule, which may be especially relevant to our current circumstances, was the 
 
5 Memorandum from the Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, to All Heads 
of Law Enforcement Components, Heads of Litigating Divisions, and United States Attorneys 
(Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/file/1262771/download [https://perma.cc/4SWV-5GSF] 
6 For an article that also asks this question, see Manal Cheema & Ashley Deeks, Prosecuting 
Purposeful Coronavirus Exposure as Terrorism, LAWFARE (Mar. 31, 2020, 10:49 AM), https://www. 
lawfareblog.com/prosecuting-purposeful-coronavirus-exposure-terrorism [https://perma.cc/2HTN-K9YX]. 
Our debt to Cheema and Deeks’s article will be obvious. They have raised all of the right questions, 
and in a very rigorous and probing way, especially for such a short piece. 
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use of terroristic threats charges in the 1990s against threats involving the 
spread of HIV. But those cases—and others where the idea of “terrorism” 
seems to get stretched far beyond the core—may give us pause. 
In Part II, we examine in detail four early “terroristic threats” cases from 
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Missouri, some of which have attracted 
intense media attention. We also consider the terroristic threat statutes and 
related case law in each of those states. The statutes in each state are close 
enough to one another to make comparisons worthwhile, but different enough 
to highlight important differences in how states have variously codified the 
crime of “terroristic threats.” Some of the cases we describe may seem closer 
to our “core case” of terroristic threatening. The focus of our analysis however, 
will, be on the possible difficulties states may encounter in trying to prosecute 
these cases as terroristic threats. We do not question the fact that such behavior 
is certainly scary and potentially harmful. Our criticism is not that these cases 
involved criminal charges; we criticize, rather, the nature of those charges. 
In Part III, we try to give greater substance to our worries about the cases 
in Part II, namely that the charging decisions in these cases may not be correct 
and may represent overcharging. We raise three brief points. The first point 
is merely a generalization of some of the worries that arose in our discussion 
of the cases in Part II: proving the mens rea in the recent terroristic threat 
cases will not always be easy. Some statutes require that there be an intent to 
commit a crime of violence, which we do not think can be proven by the threat 
to spread the virus itself. In addition, some of the threats seem to be meant 
as jokes, which, though tasteless, may not be enough to show “purposeful,” 
“knowing,” or possibly even “reckless” conduct. In many of these cases, the 
actors and their actions may be negligent at best. 
Our second point goes directly to the concern that these charges may 
represent overcharging because the behavior in these new cases is almost 
certainly punishable under other, milder criminal statutes.7 Not only can the 
behavior be punished as lesser misdemeanor crimes (for example criminal 
mischief and disorderly conduct), in many of the cases, these other crimes 
have already been charged, with the terroristic threat charge being layered on 
top. Finally, we offer that most of the work in enforcing behavior during the 
pandemic is being done by social norms, and that the heavy hand of the 
criminal law is not needed, at least not in the more minor “threat” cases. The 
people in the cases we discuss have already been pilloried repeatedly in the 
media; that ostracism itself has deterrent and even retributive value. This 
conclusion suggests that other statutes and social norms may be more 
germane in deterring and sanctioning this type of conduct than terroristic 
 
7 For a superb analysis of this point, see Cheema, supra note 6 (noting that there are other 
criminal laws which would cover the behavior in many of these cases). 
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threat statutes—especially given that, when compared to the “core cases” of 
terroristic threats, many of the COVID-19 threat cases fall far from the core 
and may not even be terroristic threat cases at all. 
I.  TERRORISTIC THREATS: HISTORY AND CONTEXT 
Reading over the statutes regarding terroristic threats, one gets a strong 
impression that they have, if only implicitly, an idea of a certain type of case 
that the statutes aim to cover—what we are going to call the “core case” of 
terroristic threats. Our reasons for calling this the “core case” will emerge 
over the course of this article, but we can state our two main reasons up front. 
First, the statutes defining “terroristic threats” are largely inspired by the 
Model Penal Code,8 whose text seems to contemplate this kind of “core” 
case.9 Second, and as helpfully reinforced by a series of New York cases from 
the early 2000s, the term “terrorism” connotes an especially grave threat—
not something that can plausibly be seen as a prank or even a sick joke.10 
A Wyoming case from the 1990s provides a good example of a typical 
“core” case and will give us a point of reference as we look at the statutes in 
more detail and examine their application to cases outside of the “core.”11 In 
1992, Henry McCone made repeated calls to the Bethesda Care Center, a 
nursing home in Laramie, Wyoming, asking to speak to his ex-girlfriend, 
Teresa Landkamer.12 When told she could not come to the phone, McCone 
hung up and called again, threatening that if his ex-girlfriend did not come 
to the phone he would go there and blow the staff nurse’s head off.13 The next 
day, McCone made two more phone calls to the nursing home.14 In the second 
 
8 For a short history of how states have—and have not—adopted the MPC into their own 
codes, see Chad Flanders, The One-State Solution to Teaching Criminal Law, or, Leaving the Common 
Law and the MPC Behind, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 167, 177-79 (2010) (describing how many states 
have partially adopted the language of the Model Penal Code into their statutes). 
9 This is confirmed by looking at the drafting notes for the MPC statute. See infra notes 37-39 
and accompanying text. 
10 This point is well made by Lydia Khalil, who highlights the possibility that extremist groups may in 
fact be making real threats, and that these threats are the ones to be taken seriously, not the threats of “idiotic 
pranksters” with “no known links to terrorist groups or political motivations behind their actions.” COVID-19 
and America’s Counter-Terrorism Response, WAR ON THE ROCKS (May 1, 2020) 
https://warontherocks.com/2020/05/covid-19-and-americas-counter-terrorism-response/ 
[https://perma.cc/ R47M-W44Q]. 
11 The “core case” we set out here should be distinguished from another possible “core case,” 
viz., a specific, targeted threat against an individual or a group of individuals. We do not dispute 
that this case, too, could be considered “core” under the statutes for many purposes. However, none 
of the COVID-19 threat cases we are aware of fit the fact pattern of a targeted threat against an 
individual, so we leave this kind of case mostly to one side. 
12 McCone v. State, 866 P.2d 740, 744 (Wyo. 1993). 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
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of these calls McCone said, “This is Tonio from Denver, unless Teresa 
Landkamer pays 2,000 owed for cocaine I will place a bomb in Bethesda Care 
Center within 24 hours.”15 In response to the call, a bomb detection unit was 
dispatched to the nursing home, and an extra officer was stationed at the home 
for security.16 The next day, after a threat by McCone that a “bomb would go 
off in 56 minutes at Bethesda,” the nursing home was evacuated.17 
McCone was arrested and charged with making terroristic threats for the 
second, fourth, and fifth calls made prior to his arrest and—amazingly—for 
another bomb threat after he was released on bail.18 The Wyoming statute, 
which was based on the Model Penal Code,19 defined the crime as follows: 
A person is guilty of a terroristic threat if he threatens to commit any violent 
felony with the intent to cause evacuation of a building, place of assembly or 
facility of public transportation, or otherwise to cause serious public 
inconvenience, or in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such 
inconvenience.20 
McCone made multiple challenges to his conviction, all of which the court 
rejected.21 In rejecting his overbreadth challenge, the court cited McCone’s 
brief, in which he conceded that “bomb threats or threats to physically hurt a 
person, made in a serious and imminent context, are not protected speech,” 
to which the court added, “[t]his is exactly what [the Wyoming statute] 
forbids and precisely what McCone accomplished by threatening to bomb 
Bethesda and shoot one of Bethesda’s employees.”22 
We would add, further, that this type of conduct seems to be exactly what 
most terroristic threatening statutes are intended to forbid, making it a good 
example of a “core case” of terroristic threatening. In those core cases, we find 
several major commonalities: (1) a credible, specific threat to commit a serious 
crime, usually a crime of violence, which is also (2) a threat to use some 
dangerous device or instrument (bomb, gun, weapon of mass destruction, 
biological agent, etc.) (3) aimed at a large number of people or a governmental 
entity and (4) intended to cause panic or force an evacuation or, in the words 
of the Wyoming statute, to cause a “serious public inconvenience.”23 
 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 745. 
19 MODEL PENAL CODE §	211.3 (AM. LAW INST. 1962). 
20 WYO. STAT. ANN. §	6-2-505 (2020). 
21 McCone, 866 P.2d at 756. 
22 Id. at 746. 
23 WYO. STAT. ANN. §	6-2-505 (2020). For a somewhat related list, see Ken LaMance, What 
Does it Mean to “Make a Terrorist Threat?”, LEGALMATCH, https://www.legalmatch.com/law-
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McCone’s case is precisely such a core case because he made multiple bomb 
threats to a nursing home which, ultimately, caused its evacuation. While the 
threats may have been false, they were nonetheless taken seriously and 
followed up on by the police. 
A look at the statutes in other states shows agreement on these major 
elements that compose a “core case.”24 The federal statute mirrors the Model 
Penal Code in outlawing terroristic threats of a crime of violence with the 
purpose to cause evacuation or serious public inconvenience.25 Alabama 
makes it a terroristic threat when someone threatens a crime of violence by 
use of a “bomb, explosive, weapon of mass destruction, firearm, deadly 
weapon, or other mechanism,” and which inter alia causes the disruption of a 
school, church, or government activity.26 Arizona adds to these the 
“dissemination .	.	. of a toxin.”27 Georgia includes the intent not only to 
commit a crime of violence but also to release a hazardous substance, or burn 
or damage property.28 Illinois says that a terrorist threat must be meant “to 
intimidate or coerce a significant portion” of the civil population; 29 Missouri 
says that the threatened act must cause fear in “ten or more” people.30 
Nebraska includes in terroristic threatening the intent to cause the evacuation 
of a building, place of assembly, or facility of public transportation.31 Many 
other state statutes reproduce in whole or in part the Model Penal Code 
language, such as Wyoming. Some statutes narrow the scope of the threats 
even further, as with Kentucky, which focuses on the threat of use or actual 
use of weapons of mass destruction.32 
To be sure, some statutes go beyond the core case in also criminalizing 
false reports that have the effect of an evacuation or public inconvenience, 
even when the threat of committing a serious crime is not present.33 When 
states have not only first degree, but second and third degree, many more 
 
library/article/making-a-terrorist-threat.html [https://perma.cc/6TQW-9693] (last modified Feb. 
27, 2019) (“[T]he threat needs to be of a highly dangerous nature.”). 
24 For an excellent review of state “terroristic threat” statutes, see Susan W. Brenner & Megan 
Rehberg, “Kiddie Crime”? The Utility of Criminal Law in Controlling Cyberbullying, 8 FIRST AMEND. 
L. REV. 1, 62 n. 255 (2009). 
25 25 C.F.R. §	11.402 (2019). 
26 ALA. CODE. §	13A-10-15(a) (2018). 
27 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §	13-2301(C)(12) (2018); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §	2308.02(A) (2017). 
28 GA. CODE ANN. §	16-11-37 (2016). 
29 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/29D-20 (2009). 
30 MO. REV. STAT. §	574.115 (2017). 
31 NEB. REV. STAT. §28-311.01 (2015). 
32 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§508.075, 508.080 (West 2001). 
33 For a broad statute like this, see, for example, DEL. CODE ANN. 11 §	621(a)(2)(a) (2015), 
which indicates that making a false statement knowing that it is likely to cause an evacuation is 
“terroristic threatening.” See also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §	508.078(1)(b)(1) (West 2020) (false 
statement with purpose of causing evacuation). 
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cases outside of the “core case” are apt to be captured.34 So while there are 
penumbras that can extend far outside of the core, the core seems always to 
be there in every state terroristic threat statute. In other words, the core 
remains the core, and it deals with the case of someone who with a weapon 
threatens to use it and causes a panic. The consequences for a violation when 
it comes to the core case are nearly always harsh.35 
The seriousness of the “core case” is underscored in the commentary to the 
1962 Model Penal Code’s terroristic threatening provision, where many state 
statutes find their inspiration.36 Threats “creating prospect of relatively trivial 
kinds of public inconvenience are excluded from this section,” the drafters 
wrote in the commentary to the code, “as are threats of personal attack 
insufficiently grave to amount to terrorization.”37 And, in a comment to an 
earlier draft, the drafters said that it was not their intent to authorize “grave 
sanctions” against “the kind of verbal threat which expresses transitory anger.”38 
If the threatened acts only created a minor public inconvenience, or the threats 
were made only in a fit of pique, the drafters advised that they should not be 
punished as terroristic threat, but under other sections of the MPC, such as 
false reporting.39 This is a point we will return to in Part III of our Essay. 
Identifying the core case can help us assess the application—or 
misapplication—of these statutes to other modern crises, before we turn to 
the more recent cases involving COVID-19. Here, a helpful first example 
might be that of New York, which passed its terroristic threat statute in 
response to the international terrorist attacks of 9/11.40 Made into law only 
days after the terrorist attacks on New York (September 17, 2007), the statute 
seems more geared to the then-recent events, as it focuses on cases where the 
aim is to intimidate a civilian population or “influence the policy” of a 
 
34 This is also the case with Kentucky’s third degree terroristic threatening statute. See KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §	508.078(1)(b)(1) (West 2020). We criticize this tendency to expand terroristic threat 
statutes beyond the “core” in Part III. 
35 See Janet Portman, Terrorist Threat Laws and Penalties, CRIMINAL DEF. LAW., 
https://www.criminaldefenselawyer.com/crime-penalties/federal/Terrorist-Threat.htm [https://perma.cc/ 
GM95-Q89W] (“Depending on the state and the nature of the threat, a conviction for making a 
terrorist threat can result in a prison sentence of 40, and even 100 or more years in prison.”). We 
also note the felony status of the recent terroristic threat cases in our discussion of them in Part II. 
36  MODEL PENAL CODE §	211.3 (AM. LAW INST. 1962). There is a suggestion that terroristic 
threat statutes were constructed in response to waves of “campus unrest” and “mob violence,” but 
we have been unable to find anything to back this up. See, e.g., State v. Gunzelman, 502 P.2d 705, 710 
(1972) (noting in passing that the Kansas terroristic threatening statute “may have been directed at 
campus unrest, fire and bomb threats to public buildings and acts of mob violence”). 
37 MODEL PENAL CODE §	211.3, cmt. (AM. LAW INST. 1962). 
38 MODEL PENAL CODE §	211.3, cmt. (AM. LAW INST. Tent. Draft No. 11, 1959). 
39 MODEL PENAL CODE §	211.3, cmt. (AM. LAW INST. 1962). 
40 N.Y. PENAL LAW §	490.00 (McKinney 2001) (“The devastating consequences of the recent 
barbaric attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon underscore the compelling need for 
legislation that is specifically designed to combat the evils of terrorism.”) 
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government.41 The statute does not require any evacuation, but only that the 
threat cause “fear” of “murder, assassination or kidnapping.”42 The focus, in 
other words, was on political terrorism. In the preamble to the article in which 
the terroristic threatening statute appears, the legislature stressed that 
terrorism was a “serious and deadly problem that disrupts public order,” and 
that, accordingly, “our laws must be strengthened to ensure that terrorists are 
prosecuted and punished in state courts with appropriate severity.”43 
But in what may provide a cautionary note for the more recent uses of 
terroristic threat statutes, the New York statute seems to have been applied 
broadly and far beyond the core of the cases identified above and what was 
originally contemplated by the New York statute.44 In a widely reported case, 
a person was charged with making a terroristic threat against a police officer 
by using a police officer emoji followed by a gun emoji.45 Prosecutors have also 
sought to charge gang violence under the “terroristic threats” statute.46 In 
rejecting this latter application, the New York Court of Appeals cautioned that 
in construing the statute, courts must be cognizant that “the concept of 
terrorism has a unique meaning and its implications risk being trivialized if 
the terminology is applied loosely in situations that do not match our collective 
 
41 Id. at §	490.20. 
42 Id. 
43 See People v. Adams, 39 N.Y.S.3d 923, 924 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2016). 
44 See Louis Jim, “Over-Kill”: The Ramifications of Applying New York’s Anti-Terrorism Statute Too 
Broadly, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 639, 640 (2010) (examining the potential for over-application of New 
York’s anti-terrorism statute and its potential for misuse). The Wikipedia entry on the New York 
law also provides an excellent overview of the law and how it has been used, with numerous citations 
to cases, and details the scope of the New York Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001. Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001, 
WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-Terrorism_Act_of_2001 [https://perma.cc/3Y2X-53PG]. 
45 See, e.g., Tim Cushing, Teen Arrested for Emoji-Laden ‘Terroristic Threats’, TECHDIRT (Jan. 30, 2015, 8:04 
AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20150129/12011529858/teen-arrested-emoji-laden-terroristic-threats. 
shtml [https://perma.cc/FBQ3-J79Z] (“[W]hat constitutes a ‘terroristic threat?’ According to the NYPD, it’s 
a line of emoji .	.	. guns pointing at an emoji cop’s heads [sic].”); How the Law Responds When Emoji Are the 
Weapon of Choice, THE CONVERSATION (Dec. 4 2017, 2:20 PM), https://theconversation.com/how-the-law-
responds-when-emoji-are-the-weapon-of-choice-88552 [https://perma.cc/9WZW-WSZC] (“[A] 17-year-old in 
New York was charged with making a terrorist threat on his Facebook page after posting a policeman emoji, 
and three guns pointing towards it.”). 
46 See Jim, supra note 44, at 640 (“A gang member being convicted of murder and manslaughter 
would be nothing new in New York City, but this case was different. This time, the jury found all 
four offenses to be ‘crimes of terrorism,’ in violation of New York’s anti-terrorism statute.”); Chantal 
Tortoroli, Gangs of New York Are Terrorists? The Misapplication of the New York Antiterrorism Statute 
Due to the Lack of Comprehensive Gang Legislation, 84 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 391, 421 (2010) (arguing 
that the New York antiterrorism statute was unconstitutionally vague and unjustly applied against a 
gang member, as “the true purpose of the statute is to fight politically motivated terrorism attacks 
against American ideals and freedoms”). 
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understanding of what constitutes a terrorist act.”47 More plausible—and more 
core—uses of terroristic threat statutes in the wake of 9/11 were those states 
who prosecuted people for threatening anthrax attacks.48 
Even more directly at the core are threats of mass shootings, which made 
up the bulk of terroristic threat cases in the last several years (at least prior 
to the recent use of terroristic threat statutes in COVID-19 cases). Indeed, a 
digest of these cases cites no less than five cases in the month of August 2019, 
in which a person was charged with making a terroristic threat of a “mass 
shooting.”49 In one nationally reported case, days after a mass shooting in a 
Texas Walmart, a man walked into a Missouri Walmart with a handgun and 
a rifle; he was charged under the state’s terroristic threats statute.50 New 
York’s terroristic threat statute has also been used against students who have 
threatened to “shoot up” high schools.51 And in another school case, a 
custodian in New York was charged under the terroristic threat statute when 
he invoked Columbine in making threats against a teacher.52 These types of 
 
47 People v. Morales, 20 N.Y.3d 240, 249, (N.Y. 2012). But cf. People v. Jenner, 835 N.Y.S.2d 501 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2007) (rejecting an argument by the defendant, who had threatened to shoot up the Department 
of Social Services, that “his conduct was not what the Legislature had in mind when it enacted this statute 
after the terroristic attacks of September 11, 2001 and he should not be labeled a terrorist”). 
48 As a brief summary of these cases: 
[S]everal states have used their terroristic threat or terrorizing statutes to prosecute 
anthrax hoaxsters. For one example, a man who had told workers in the downtown 
office of the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare that he had a box containing 
anthrax was charged with making a terroristic threat, even though he claimed to suffer 
from a mental illness. In another instance, Andrew James Theodorakis, a senior at 
Dickinson College, faced charges of both terroristic threatening and causing a 
catastrophe for placing white powder in two envelopes sent through intercampus mail 
bearing the message, ‘You now have anthrax. Prepare to die.’ 
Ira P. Robbins, Anthrax Hoaxes, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 36-37 (2004) (footnotes omitted). 
49 Steve Almasy, Dave Alsup & Madeline Holcombe, Dozens of People Have Been Arrested over Threats 
to Commit Mass Attacks Since the El Paso and Dayton Shootings, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2019/08/21/us/mass-
shooting-threats-tuesday/index.html [https://perma.cc/P4UD-2FT2] (last updated Aug. 22, 2019, 10:58 AM). 
50 Bill Chappel & Richard Gonzalez, Rifle-Carrying Man Faces Terrorism Charge After Causing Panic 
at Walmart in Missouri, NPR (Aug. 19, 2019, 11:08 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/08/09/749763786/rifle-
carrying-man-arrested-after-causing-panic-at-walmart-in-missouri [https://perma.cc/QU6D-3WV9]. 
51 See, e.g., Matthew Saari, Fifth-Grader Charged for ‘Terroristic Threat’, MANCHESTER MEDIA 
(June 20, 2018), https://manchesternewspapers.com/2018/06/20/fifth-grader-charged-for-terroristic-
threat/ [https://perma.cc/F3FA-Y76F] (explaining that an elementary student was arrested by New 
York State Police and charged for threatening to “shoot up” the school’s high school with an 
automatic weapon); see also Annie Johnson, Sheriff: St. Martin High Student Arrested After Threatening 
to ‘Shoot up the School’, WLOX (Sept. 7, 2019, 11:48 AM), https://www.wlox.com/2019/09/07/st-
martin-high-student-arrested-after-threatening-shoot-up-school/ [https://perma.cc/EL4Y-3MRL] 
(explaining that a student was charged under Mississippi terroristic threat statute for a post saying 
he would shoot up his school). These charges may be controversial because they involve charging 
juveniles with serious felonies; our point is only that the type of threat here is in fact plausibly 
seen as “terroristic.” 
52 People v. Hulsen, 56 N.Y.S.3d 335, 337 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017). 
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threats seem to fall indisputably under the “core”—the threats are serious and 
involve the promised use of a weapon, buildings are evacuated, and many 
people are potentially put at risk. The prosecution of these cases as “terroristic 
threats” seems unproblematic, especially when those making mass-shooting 
threats are adults. 
A particularly controversial use of terroristic threat statutes that seems to 
sweep beyond the core is the prosecution of those who threaten to spread 
HIV.53 Given the current use of terroristic threat statutes regarding another 
virus, these cases should be of special interest to us, and the extension of 
terroristic threats to cover them—like the expansion of the 9/11 terroristic 
threat statute in New York—may also provide us with a cautionary tale. The 
connection, if any, of the AIDS crisis cases to the core case seems strained. 
The threats are usually directed at one person or a small number of people, 
and it is usually unclear how real the actual danger was. Many of these cases 
happen in prison, and the threats are directed at guards by incarcerated 
individuals. In one New Jersey case, a jail inmate threatened to bite or spit on 
an officer’s hand in an attempt to infect him with HIV.54 In a Pennsylvania 
case, a person taken into custody scratched an officer’s hand with his 
fingernails.55 Both convictions were affirmed.56 
These prosecutions can appear problematic, but not because they are not 
serious. Indeed, such cases are serious enough that they can be, and 
sometimes are, prosecuted under homicide statutes. People who threaten to 
infect someone with a disease may in fact be guilty of attempted murder.57 
But our question is whether they are properly prosecuted under terroristic 
threat statutes, especially if we take the core case discussed above as 
paradigmatic of what those statutes are meant to cover. There is, for starters, 
 
53 For an article that provides a useful context for these cases, see Angela Perone, From Punitive 
to Proactive: An Alternative Approach for Responding to HIV Criminalization That Departs from Penalizing 
Marginalized Communities, 24 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 363, 378-79 (2013). 
54 State v. Smith, 621 A.2d 493, 495 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993). 
55 Commonwealth v. Walker, 836 A.2d 999, 1001 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003). 
56 Id. at 1002; Smith, 621 A.2d at 516. 
57 See, for example, the following summary of cases from a Maryland state appellate decision: 
In State v. Caine, 652 So.2d 611 (La.App.), cert. denied, 661 So.2d 1358 (La.1995), a 
conviction for attempted second degree murder was upheld where the defendant had 
jabbed a used syringe into a victim’s arm while shouting “I’ll give you AIDS.” Id. at 
616. The defendant in Weeks v. State, 834 S.W.2d 559 (Tex.App.1992), made similar 
statements, and was convicted of attempted murder after he spat on a prison guard. 
In that case, the defendant knew that he was HIV-positive, and the appellate court 
found that “the record reflects that [Weeks] thought he could kill the guard by spitting 
his HIV-infected saliva at him.” Id. at 562. There was also evidence that at the time of 
the spitting incident, Weeks had stated that he was “going to take someone with him 
when he went,’ that he was ‘medical now,’ and that he was ‘HIV-4.’”  
Smallwood v. State, 680 A.2d 512, 517 (Md. 1996) (alternation in the original). 
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usually nothing “mass” about the HIV cases: they involve only a threat 
directed at one person. We believe that such terrorism charges may reflect 
more of a sense of panic—of irrational fear—than of the correct 
characterization of the bad behavior. Because that fear may also be present in 
the response to the COVID-19 virus cases, the older AIDS crisis cases may 
provide a good touchstone.58 
II.  COVID-19 THREATS AS “TERRORISTIC.” 
In this Part we move from the general to the specific, and examine in 
detail four recent cases involving threats to infect someone with or spread 
COVID-19 from four different states: Cody Lee Pfister, in Missouri; George 
Falcone, in New Jersey; Margaret Cirko, in Pennsylvania; and Lorraine 
Maradiaga, in Texas. Does terroristic threatening work as a proper charge in 
these cases, based on the state’s statute and case law? Do these cases fall near 
the core case identified in the preceding Part? Even if the statutes in these 
charges makes it possible to convict these four individuals, is it desirable? 
While we will suggest answers to some of these questions in what follows, 
our full answers to them will have to wait until Part III. 
A.  Missouri 
One of the earliest cases happened in Missouri, where Cody Lee Pfister 
was charged with making a terroristic threat in the second degree for filming 
himself licking several deodorant sticks at a local Walmart.59 In the video—
which he posted on social media—Pfister looks at the camera and asks, “[w]ho’s 
scared of coronavirus?”60 The statute Pfister was charged under reads: 
A person commits the offense of making a terrorist threat in the second degree 
if he or she recklessly disregards the risk of causing the evacuation, quarantine 
or closure of any portion of a building, inhabitable structure, place of assembly 
or facility of transportation and knowingly .	.	. [c]auses a false belief or fear that 
an incident has occurred or that a condition exists involving danger to life.61 
 
58 Khalil, supra note 10, also points out the possibility that, at least under the federal statutes, 
the relevant biological agent must be engineered or synthesized. This fact has not stopped charges 
involving HIV from being made at the state level, however. 
59 Rachel Rice, Man Charged After Police Say He Licked Items at Warrenton Walmart to Mock Virus 
Fears, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.stltoday.com/lifestyles/health-
med-fit/coronavirus/man-charged-after-police-say-he-licked-items-at-warrenton-walmart-to-mock-
virus-fears/article_2e9d0fc7-b21a-5ebc-a8e9-cc181f3f3934.html [https://perma.cc/QH3X-EVN6]. 
60 Id. 
61 MO. REV. STAT. §	574.120 (2017). 
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The statute obviously departs from the core case discussed above in that 
it does not require the threat of committing a serious crime either with or 
without a weapon. It does, however, fit with the core in that it ties the making 
of the terroristic threat to a risk of causing an “evacuation, quarantine, or 
closure” of a building. The second-degree threat statute, unlike the first, does 
not require that the person have directed the threat to “ten or more people.”62 
Both Pfister and his lawyer have aggressively courted the press. Pfister 
has already appeared on an Instagram live podcast with Michael Rapaport.63 
Pfister’s defense—as put forward by his attorney—seems to be that at the 
time he recorded the video, March 10, 2020, the World Health Organization 
had not yet declared that the spread of COVID-19 was officially a “pandemic,” 
and President Trump was still advising people to “stay calm.”64 Pfister 
commented to Rappaport that he was only trying to prank a worried friend 
and that he (Pfister) wasn’t “scared” because he didn’t think the virus was “a 
big deal.”65 Pfister’s attorney is hoping for a plea deal for “peace disturbance 
or something.”66 Missouri sets a second-degree terroristic threat as a Class E 
felony, which carries a maximum sentence of four years.67 
Several Missouri appeals court cases have reversed charges of making a 
terroristic threat in the first degree when it was clear that the defendant did 
not in fact have the purpose of causing an evacuation, or that the statements 
representing the threat were mere ramblings.68 If Pfister were charged for 
making a terroristic threat in the first degree, this would probably represent 
a winning argument if it is true, as Pfister said on the Rappaport podcast that 
he was only making an “inside joke” by licking the deodorant.69 But Pfister 
was charged under the second-degree version of the statute, which does not 
require a showing of purpose. All it requires is a showing that Pfister knew 
he was making a false claim, that the false claim involved a condition that 
 
62 Id.; Id. §	574.115(1) (2017). 
63 Doyle Murphy, The Walmart Coronavirus Licker’s Defense, RIVERFRONT TIMES (Apr. 3, 
2020, 11:04 AM), https://www.riverfronttimes.com/newsblog/2020/04/03/the-walmart-coronavirus-lickers-
defense [https://perma.cc/SZ8H-MUQX]. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 MO. REV. STAT. §§	574.115(1), (2), 558.011 (2017). 
68 See State v. Metzinger, 456 S.W.3d 84, 97 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015) (explaining that the context 
of the defendant’s tweets containing “references to pressure cookers and allusions to the Boston 
Marathon bombing,” showed that “a reasonable recipient would not interpret them as serious 
expressions of an intent to commit violence” in affirming the trial court’s opinion to dismiss the 
case); ex rel. C.G.M. v. Juvenile Officer, 258 S.W.3d 879, 883 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that the 
defendant’s question to his friend of whether his friend “wanted to help blow up the school” if he 
received dynamite for his birthday did not qualify as a true threat because it was unclear “whether 
the speaker [was] making a serious expression to cause an incident involving danger to life”). 
69 Doyle Murphy, supra note 63. 
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presented a danger to human life, and that in making that claim Pfister 
recklessly disregarded the risk of causing the evacuation, closure, or 
quarantine of a building. 
In one case from 2018, a Missouri court of appeals held that the defendant 
was in fact aware of the risk that his knowingly false statements would lead 
to an evacuation.70 But this case seems distinguishable from Pfister’s: it 
involved clear, and clearly articulated, threats to shoot up a school.71 That is, 
the threat seemed serious, and it seemed that the student knew what he was 
saying and was aware of what reaction it would (and did) cause—panic. 
Pfister, on the other hand, might claim that he did not know how COVID-19 
could spread, or even that he could spread it; he could also claim that he did 
not know how fatal the virus was (hence the idea that he was not afraid of the 
virus, and maybe no one should be). In other words, Pfister’s claim might be 
that at the time, he thought everything about COVID-19 was being 
overblown, and that he was simply unaware of the seriousness of what he was 
doing. He may have not known the risks he was taking, which is different 
than saying he was aware of the risks but disregarded them—but it is the 
latter claim that has to be true to prove he was reckless. 
B.  New Jersey 
George Falcone was charged under New Jersey’s terroristic threat statute 
for coughing on a worker who said he was too close to the food display at a 
Wegmans.72 After he coughed, Falcone allegedly laughed and told the worker 
that “he was infected with the virus.”73 Referring to Falcone’s actions later 
that day, the Governor of New Jersey said, “[t]here are knuckleheads out 
there. We see them and we are enforcing behavior.”74 The Attorney General 
of New Jersey, Gurbir S. Grewal, has generally indicated that he will take a 
hard line on threats involving the COVID-19 virus: “[W]e vow to respond 
swiftly and strongly whenever someone commits a criminal offense that uses 
 
70 ex rel. D.C.M. v. Pemiscot Cty. Juvenile Office, 578 S.W.3d 776, 787 (Mo. 2019). 
71 Id. 
72 Neil Vigdor, A Man Coughed on a Wegmans Employee. Now He’s Charged With a Felony, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/25/us/coronavirus-terrorism-nj.html 
[https://perma.cc/R2HT-VH66]. 
73 Id. 
74 Man Who Maliciously Coughed on Wegmans Employee Charged with Creating the Terrorist Threat, 
USA REALLY, (Mar. 25, 2020, 11:46 AM), https://usareally.com/6055-man-who-maliciously-coughed-
on-wegmans-employee-charged-with-creating-the-terrorist-threat [https://perma.cc/9CQB-A8E2]. 
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the coronavirus to generate panic or discord.”75 The New Jersey third degree 
terroristic threat statute reads: 
A person is guilty of a crime of the third degree if he threatens to commit 
any crime of violence with the purpose to terrorize another or to cause 
evacuation of a building, place of assembly, or facility of public 
transportation, or otherwise to cause serious public inconvenience, or in 
reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror or inconvenience.76 
If convicted, Falcone could be sentenced up to ten years imprisonment 
because his threat came during a national emergency.77 
One initial question we might have about the Falcone case—and it will 
reappear with the Texas case considered below—is whether Falcone indeed 
threatened to commit a “crime of violence” when he coughed on the Wegmans 
grocery worker. There does not seem to be a separate statutory definition of a 
crime of violence under the New Jersey code.78 But intuitively, it does not seem 
plausible that the act of coughing on another—without more—falls under the 
class of a crime of violence.79 Certainly, Falcone’s behavior—while 
objectionable—is not like the core case of calling in a bomb threat that forces 
the evacuation of a nursing home. Nor is it obvious that Falcone’s purpose in 
coughing on the worker was to “terrorize her,” rather than show his annoyance.80 
It seems even harder to prove that his purpose was to cause the evacuation of 
the store. As with Pfister, however, a claim of recklessness (which is also 
 
75 Tamar Lapin, New Jersey Man Charged After Coughing on Wegmans Worker, Saying He Has Coronavirus, 
N.Y. POST, (Mar. 24, 2020, 10:01 PM), https://nypost.com/2020/03/24/new-jersey-man-arrested-after-
coughing-on-wegmans-worker-saying-he-has-coronavirus/ [https://perma.cc/XJK7-MZBD]. 
76 N.J. STAT. ANN. §	2C:12-3(a) (West 2002). 
77 Id.; N.J. STAT. ANN. §	2C:43-6a(2) (West 2013). 
78 The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division has explained that 
In order for a jury to be properly guided it must be instructed on the qualities of ‘any crime 
of violence’ the proofs suggest the defendant may have threatened. That is, the elements 
and definition of any such crimes must be adequately explained to the jury, so that the 
jury is not left to speculate as to the crimes that might be supported by the evidence. 
State v. MacIlwraith, 782 A.2d 964, 966 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001). 
79 Although not from New Jersey, an Arizona case is illuminating on this point: 
Although the 2002 conviction was classified as assault, Pesqueira concedes that it merely 
involved spitting on a corrections officer while incarcerated. And although spitting is 
insulting, it is not a crime of violence. See State v. Arnett, 119 Ariz. 38, 51, 579 P.2d 542, 555 
(1978) (defining violence as “‘the exertion of any physical force so as to injure or abuse’”), 
quoting WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d unabr. ed. 1976). 
State v. Pesqueira, No. 2-2008-0390, 2009 WL 3790443, at *5 (Ariz. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2009). 
80 The statutory definition of “terrorize” is “to convey the menace or fear of death or serious 
bodily injury by words or actions.” N.J. STAT. ANN §	2C: 38-2(d) (West 2020). “Terror” means “the 
menace or fear of death or serious bodily injury.” Id. 
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contemplated by the statute) may be easier to prove, but again, it still must be 
recklessness as to terrorizing or of causing a “serious public inconvenience.” 
The New Jersey pattern jury instructions also appear favorable to Falcone. 
As part of the charge, the jury is to be instructed that it is “not a violation of 
this statute if the threat expresses fleeting anger or was made merely to 
alarm.”81 Although Falcone went on to suggest (sarcastically) that the 
employees at Wegmans were lucky to have jobs, he might press the point that 
his anger was merely “fleeting,” as he was upset at being told to step back 
from the food display. Again, as with Pfister, we have a situation where we 
are forced to distinguish between foolish behavior and behavior meant to 
terrorize or cause an evacuation. 
C.  Pennsylvania 
In late March 2020, Margaret Cirko walked into a local Pennsylvania 
supermarket and allegedly began deliberately coughing and spitting on rows 
of produce, baked goods, and meat.82 Cirko apparently made statements that 
she was sick as she was doing this. As a result, the store had to throw out over 
$35,000 of produce. The store owner, Joe Fasula later said that Cirko’s actions 
made it a “challenging day,”83 and that while there was “little doubt this 
woman was doing it as a very twisted prank, we will not take any chances with 
the health and well-being of our customers.”84 Cirko was served with multiple 
charges, including two felony counts of making a terroristic threat. The 
Pennsylvania terroristic threat statute reads in relevant part, “[a] person 
commits the crime of terroristic threats if the person communicates, either 
directly or indirectly, a threat to .	.	.	. cause serious public inconvenience, or 
cause terror or serious public inconvenience with reckless disregard of the risk 
of causing such terror or inconvenience.”85 According to news reports, Cirko 
has a history of “past problems in the community” and was initially sent to a 
mental hospital for an evaluation.86 If convicted, Cirko could be imprisoned 
for up to seven years for a third-degree felony.87 
 
81 State v. Tindell, 10 A.3d 1203, 1216 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011). 
82 Elisha Fieldstadt, Woman Who Coughed on $35k Worth of Grocery Store Food Charged with Four 
Felonies, NBC NEWS (Mar. 26, 2020, 10:16 AM) https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/grocery-
store-throws-out-35k-worth-food-woman-coughed-twisted-n1169401 [https://perma.cc/52YA-N82B]. 
83 Id. 
84 PA Supermarket Tossed $35K Worth of Food After Woman Coughed on it as Prank, Owner Says, 
24NEWS (Mar. 26, 2020), https://nbc24.com/news/coronavirus/pa-supermarket-tossed-35k-worth-of-food-
after-woman-coughed-on-it-as-prank-owner-says [https://perma.cc/Z6ZB-8NCN]. 
85 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §	2706(a) (2002). 
86 Pennsylvania Coughing ‘Prank’ Suspect Arrested, Charged After $35K in Groceries Tossed, 
FOX6NOW.COM, (Mar. 29, 2020, 2:27 PM), https://fox6now.com/2020/03/29/pennsylvania-coughing-
prank-suspect-arrested-charged-after-35g-in-groceries-tossed/ [https://perma.cc/MR86-EEHF]. 
87 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §	1103(3) (1995). 
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The nature of Cirko’s threat, as indirectly revealed by her behavior, is not 
clear. Charging her with making a terroristic threat in this context means she 
intended her behavior to cause a “serious public inconvenience.” While it seems 
true that the result of Cirko’s actions was a serious public inconvenience, this is 
not the same as finding that the cause of the public inconvenience was intended 
as—or even reasonably understood as—the communication of a “threat.” Again, 
a comparison to our core case will prove helpful. In the McCone case, the 
defendant actually called in a threat to bomb the nursing home. Is coughing on 
food and saying you are sick the same as phoning in a bomb threat? 
Pennsylvania, like New Jersey, also has a constraint that the threat cannot 
be merely “transitory.”88 According to the commentary on the Pennsylvania 
code, the statute was not meant to penalize “spur-of-the-moment threats 
which result from anger.”89 Pennsylvania courts have characterized this 
limitation on the statute as going to whether the defendant had “the requisite 
intent to terrorize.”90 Rather than a mere transitory sentiment, the facts must 
show a “settled purpose to carry out the threat or to terrorize the other 
person.”91 If what Cirko did was meant as a prank or a sick joke—or was a 
product of mental illness—it may be hard to show that she had the intent to 
put others “in a state of fear that agitates body and mind.”92 
D.  Texas 
Like Cody Lee Pfister, Lorraine Maradiaga’s alleged threats came over 
social media. In what seems to have been a thematically connected series of 
Snapchat videos, Maradiaga first filmed herself going through a COVID-19 
testing site, apparently to get tested.93 She then made a video of herself in a 
Walmart saying that she was going to “infest” the store and that “if I’m going 
down, all y’all [expletive] going down.”94 In the last video, Maradiaga told 
those who wanted to get the coronavirus and die that they should call her.95 
Texas police arrested Maradiaga for her videos and charged her with making 
 
88 Commonwealth v. Walker, 836 A.2d 999, 1001 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003). 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Commonwealth v. Kidd, 442 A.2d 826, 827 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982). 
92 Id. 
93 Morgan Gstalter, Texas Teen Who Threatened to Spread Coronavirus Charged with Making Terroristic 
Threat, THE HILL, (Apr. 8, 2020, 1:14 PM), https://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/491798-
texas-teen-who-threatened-to-spread-coronavirus-faces-terrorism [https://perma.cc/27TA-M2K2]. 
94 LaVendrick Smith, Carrollton Police Arrest Teen Who Said She Would Spread Coronavirus at 
Walmart, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (Apr. 7, 2020, 3:32 PM) https://www.dallasnews.com/ 
news/crime/2020/04/07/carrollton-police-arrest-teen-who-said-shed-spread-coronavirus-at-
walmart/ [https://perma.cc/5QGY-MV9S]. 
95 Gstalter, supra note 93. 
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a felony terroristic threat in the third degree.96 The Texas statute under which 
Maradiaga was charged reads “A person commits an offense if he [sic] 
threatens to commit any offense involving violence to any person or property 
with intent to .	.	. place the public or a substantial group of the public in fear 
of serious bodily injury.”97 After the initial public backlash against her videos, 
but apparently before she was arrested, Maradiaga posted a video that claimed 
“it was all an April Fool’s joke.”98 If convicted, Maradiaga could face between 
two and ten years imprisonment.99 
Maradiaga’s case may seem the hardest to defend, at least until we test it 
against the statute. Maradiaga did seem to explicitly threaten to cause people 
injury when she said that she was going to infest the Wal-Mart in order to 
have everyone go down with her. Although Maradiaga may not have been 
COVID-19 positive, this fact is not relevant to whether her behavior falls 
under the statute, since Texas courts have held that it is not necessary “for the 
accused to have the capability or the intention to actually carry out the 
threat.”100 All that is necessary, a Texas court said in 2006, is that “the accused, 
by her threat, sought as a desired reaction to place a person in fear of 
imminent serious bodily injury.”101 There is a strong case that this is precisely 
what Maradiaga did with her video. 
However, like New Jersey’s statute, there must also be a threat to commit 
an offense “involving violence,” and it does not appear as if Texas has a statutory 
definition of what constitutes a crime of violence. Texas courts have held that 
crimes such as arson are per se crimes of violence but that other crimes, like 
burglary, depend more on a case-by-case determination.102 As one court put it, 
the meaning of an “act of violence” seems only to have the “meaning that would 
be ascribed to it by persons of ordinary intelligence.”103 While Maradiaga’s 
threat—like Cirko’s—almost certainly resulted in substantial costs incurred by 
Wal-Mart, it is not obvious that the damage was caused by a “crime of violence.” 
Bombing a building involves violence; it is less clear that coughing, even when 
accompanied by a threat to infect people, is a “violent” act, either inherently or 
as a matter of the facts of Maradiaga’s case. 
 
96 Id. 
97 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §	22.07(a) (West 2017). 
98 Alex Boyer, Police Searching for Carrollton 18-Year-Old Who Claims to Be ‘Willingly Spreading’ 
COVID-19, FOX 5 NEW YORK (Apr. 5, 2020), https://www.fox5ny.com/news/police-searching-for-
carrollton-18-year-old-who-claims-to-be-willingly-spreading-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/Z64C-8C2Y]. 
99 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §	12.34(a) (West 2009). 
100 Williams v. State, 194 S.W.3d 568, 575 (Tex. App. 2006), aff ’d, 252 S.W.3d 353 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 2008). 
101 Id. 
102 Burks v. State, 876 S.W.2d 877, 894 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). 
103 Gardner v. State, 699 S.W.2d 831, 836 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). 
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III.  COVID-19 AND TERRORISTIC THREATS: AN ASSESSMENT 
Our discussion of the recent COVID-19 threat cases was marked by some 
skepticism, as it seemed to us that there were plausible questions that could 
be raised about the appropriateness of those charges. The behavior in these 
cases certainly seems scary, but does it rise to the level of what we have called 
the core case of terroristic threatening—or even come close? The participants 
themselves seemed to recognize that what they did was foolish, stupid, and 
even dangerous, while at the same time asserting that it was not meant 
seriously, or was a prank or an inside joke. When viewed in this light, their 
behavior does not rise to the level of calling in a bomb threat that results in 
the evacuation of a nursing home. 
This rather lenient conclusion may be rash. Even if these cases do not 
reach the core, they may still be covered by the periphery of those statutes, 
especially as we move away from the first-degree statutes in these states and 
into the lower degrees. In this Part, we broaden our analysis to raise 
substantive questions about charging terroristic threatening in these cases, 
even when those charges are not first degree. While our argument stems 
partly from the fact that these cases are far from the “core case,” there is more 
to it than that.104 We raise three points. First, generalizing from what we have 
said about the individual cases above, there may be a problem with proving 
the requisite mental state in COVID-19 threat cases. Second, there may be 
other more appropriate charges to bring in these cases. Third, it may be that 
what does most of the work in deterring conduct like that in the charged cases 
is not the criminal law, but social norms more generally and the societal 
condemnation that violations of those norms can incur. 
A.  Mens Rea 
There seem to be several difficulties with proving the mental state in the 
recent run of threats of COVID-19 transmission. If there is a requirement of 
purpose in the statute, this may be hard to show if the object of the threat was not 
to frighten or terrorize, but to play a prank. If someone meant it only as a joke, 
then it is not obvious that the requisite intent was there, especially the more 
specific that intent needs to be.105 Does a person who plays a joke have the intent 
to cause an evacuation or to cause a serious public inconvenience? It may be hard 
 
104 Relevant here is a larger concern with overcriminalization. This is true with regards to both 
what acts get charged as crimes at all, as well as with prosecutors deciding to go with the harshest 
possible charge when those acts are charged as crimes. See generally Chad Flanders & Desiree Austin-
Holliday, Dangerous Instruments: A Case Study in Overcriminalization, 83 MO. L. REV. 259 (2018). 
105 See, e.g., Thomas v. Commonwealth, 574 S.W.2d 903, 910 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (stating that the 
Kentucky version of the terroristic threat statute does not apply “in the case of idle talk or jesting”). 
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to prove this beyond a reasonable doubt. And, as referenced in regard to the 
Maradiaga case, there may be an additional problem of proving that there was 
even an intention to engage in a crime of violence, whatever that turns out to be. 
Merely threatening to cough on someone does not seem to show an intent to 
commit a crime of physically hurting someone or physically damaging property. 
If the intention to commit the crime has to be joined with an intent to cause an 
evacuation, the problems of proof will multiply.106 
Intentional actions are usually only required in the first-degree versions 
of the terroristic threat statutes. But many of the recent cases are instead 
charged under a theory of recklessness, where the persons are charged with 
consciously disregarding a substantial risk that their actions will have certain 
consequences—an evacuation or putting people in fear of serious injury. But 
there may be problems of proof here as well. As the attorney in the Pfister 
case emphasized, to consciously disregard a risk, one must be subjectively 
aware that there was a risk in the first place. So, a lot will turn on what the 
defendant was, in fact, aware of. Did they know that COVID-19 was a serious 
disease capable of causing death? Did they know how it would spread and, 
more particularly, that their actions could spread the disease? Did they know 
that they had, or could have, the virus? 107 In the early days of the pandemic, 
some could claim—perhaps plausibly—that they simply did not know the 
gravity of the risk they were taking because they were uninformed or simply 
of a different opinion. All of these facts may speak to whether they even knew 
they were making the sort of threat alleged, e.g., that they knew that they 
were making a “false report” of an incident that was a “danger to human 
 
106 These statutes thus need to be distinguished from other statutes, which may only require 
that a “reasonable person” believe that a threat was being made, regardless of the purported 
threatener’s intent. The standard in these statutes, in other words, is subjective, rather than 
objective. See, e.g., United States v. Segui, No. 19-188, 2019 WL 8587291, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 
2019) (discussing the distinction between objective and subjective standards as it applies to federal 
threat statutes). 
107 The analogy to the spread of HIV seems apt here. People are coughing or spitting with the 
alleged intention of spreading COVID-19. However, it is not clear that any of the people charged 
with terroristic threats in these recent cases were infected with COVID-19 or believed they were, or 
were aware that they could transmit the virus. Note that this point goes not to whether other people 
might have been put in fear by the threat, but whether the person making the threat was aware that 
he or she was communicating a threat. But cf. State v. Smith, 621 A.2d 493, 517-18 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1993) (rejecting the defense that it was medically impossible to transmit HIV through a 
bite so corrections officer could not have reasonably feared infection). 
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life.”108 Finally, in specific cases, we might also ask: were they aware of the 
risk that the building would have to be evacuated?109 
Note that it is important in this regard not to confuse being negligent and 
being reckless. Most of these defendants were negligent beyond a reasonable 
doubt—meaning that even though they may not have known the risk they were 
taking, they should have known, and a reasonable person would have been 
aware of those risks. All of the cases discussed in the previous Part meet this 
standard. This makes us believe that terroristic threatening charges—if they 
are to be made at all—might be appropriate in these cases on a theory of 
negligence, and some statutes in their lesser degrees allow for that. But if the 
mental state required is reckless, the necessary factual proof is different. Under 
a theory of recklessness, the state needs to prove not just that this person 
should have known that what they were doing was irresponsible, but that they 
were aware that their behavior was risky and proceeded to do it anyway. If the 
mental state is knowledge or purpose, the state’s burden is even higher. 110 
B.  Alternative Charges 
There is no requirement on prosecutors that they bring the least serious 
charge compatible with criminal behavior; indeed, the practice of many 
prosecutors is quite the opposite. To get maximum leverage in plea 
negotiations, prosecutors tend to overcharge, both in terms of charging as many 
 
108 MO. REV. STAT. §§	574.115(1), (2) (2017). We do not even consider here the question of 
whether some of the defendants in these cases were mentally ill, although this seems a distinct 
possibility. In a case where the mental illness of the defendant was a relevant factor in an acquittal 
on a terroristic threat charge, a Georgia court explained that: 
Considering together the identity of the party to whom the message was directed, the 
conditional nature of the message, and the evidence as to the defendant’s history of mental 
illness, including paranoia, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could not reasonably 
determine under the evidence presented in this case that the State has proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt an intent on the part of the defendant to terrorize Captain Johnson. 
Wiggins v. State, 319 S.E.2d 528, 530 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984). 
109 Cf. State v. Tanis, 247 S.W.3d 610, 615 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008) (“Such understanding of the 
possible legal consequences of his actions further evidences Mr. Tanis’s conscious disregard of the 
risk that a portion of Park University would be evacuated.”). 
110 In the past, constitutional challenges have been made to terroristic threat statutes, and we 
might see similar challenges raised in these cases. The main claim has been that such statutes are 
vague and overbroad. Words like “terrorize” seem especially vague, where someone might be left to 
guess what it means to cause terror in another person. A similar vagueness challenge has been made 
against “to evacuate,” but that seems much less persuasive. “Serious public inconvenience” seems to 
fall somewhere in between “terrorize” and “evacuate” in terms of vagueness. First Amendment 
challenges (whether vagueness or overbreadth), however, have been almost uniformly rejected by 
the courts, so we do not consider them here. But see State v. Hamilton, 340 N.W.2d 397 (Neb. 1983) 
(finding an early version of the Nebraska terroristic threat statute unconstitutionally vague). 
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crimes as possible, and the highest degree of a charge as possible.111 The cases 
in the previous sections can be seen as examples of overcharging; even though 
other charges might be adequate, the charge of terroristic threatening is at least 
permissible, if not plausible, and can helpfully be used to drive a hard bargain. 
But if the problem is technically permissible but overzealous charging, 
then our issue may not be in the first instance with prosecutors (who after all 
are still charging within the limits of the law), but with the legislature that 
wrote the laws in such a capacious way. The laws should have been written 
more carefully, so that only core cases could be charged as terroristic threats. 
And in fact, we believe that the strongest case for such laws is usually only 
when those laws are limited to covering the core cases, which would mean 
getting rid of most second and third degree terroristic threatening statutes. 
But we try to make a more modest point here: even though it may be 
correct to charge some COVID-19 threat cases as terroristic, it may be that 
other charges are the most appropriate in the end. The laws can still be on 
the books, but prosecutors should exercise their discretion and limit 
terroristic threat charges mostly to the core cases. We leave for another day 
the further suggestion that terroristic threat laws that cover cases outside the 
core cases should not be on the books at all.112 
Why, then, should prosecutors largely refrain from using terroristic threat 
laws when faced with cases that might fit the statutes, but that fall beyond the 
“core”? Partly, the name terroristic conveys something much larger and much 
more ominous than what has happened in these cases. Such a worry about 
stretching “terrorism” to cover simple assault cases is present in some of the 
post-9/11 New York cases we saw earlier, and we find those cautionary notes 
persuasive, even compelling.113 We risk lessening the force of the “terrorist” 
label when we move to cases that involve threats against one person or cases 
that would otherwise be charged as more common crimes—even when that 
more common crime might be homicide. Not all homicides are terrorism. 
Something similar might be said about the move to categorize threats to 
spread HIV as involving “terrorism.” 
Another part of our concern with charging terrorist threats in the COVID-
19 cases is that many of these cases were meant to be understood as jokes or 
 
111 Andrew Manuel Crespo, The Hidden Law of Plea Bargaining, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1303, 1304 
(2018) (“As plea bargaining scholars have long recounted, prosecutors’ ability to threaten inflated 
sentences, combined with their power to trade those sentences away for pleas of guilt, allows them 
to control who goes to prison and for how long.” (internal quotation omitted)). 
112 One could of course imagine an even more limited core that limited terroristic threatening 
to crimes that involved political terrorism, as the New York law attempts to do. See supra Part I. 
113 See Sepulveda, supra note 3 (quoting Wendy Parmet, director of the Center for Health 
Policy and Law at Northeastern University, as saying “it’s really also important to understand the 
differences between a naturally occurring disease and, you know, an act of war”). 
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pranks, were early in the spread of the pandemic, and the people who are being 
charged have faced and will face much in the way of societal condemnation for 
what they have done. If these factors do not incline necessarily towards mercy—
and we are not suggesting that they should—our attitudes toward these cases 
may be leavened by the fact that there are other, alternative charges that can be 
made so that the bad actors will not avoid criminal punishment. 
In half of the cases we have discussed, the persons were charged with other 
crimes. Cirko was charged with criminal mischief and disorderly conduct.114 
She will almost certainly, as part of a plea deal or because of a guilty conviction, 
be made to pay for the damage she caused to the store. Falcone was charged 
with harassment and, because he would not give his identification to a 
detective, obstruction of justice.115 It does not seem as if Pfister or Maradiaga 
have been charged with anything other than terroristic threatening, although 
whether that charge remains after plea negotiations is an open question. 
Pfister is back in jail, however, for violating the terms of his probation.116 
The Cirko and Falcone cases show how in these cases, there will be other 
charges available to prosecutors besides terroristic threatening, including 
criminal mischief, where destruction of property is at issue, and disorderly 
conduct, which usually includes the causing of a public inconvenience. Missouri 
and Texas have similar laws.117 Further, while many terroristic threat statutes 
include false reporting provisions, these also exist as separate laws in many states 
as well.118 Even a simple trespassing charge seems warranted in several of the 
cases. The threat to spread COVID-19, especially if directed at a particular 
individual, could be charged as assault. Many of these crimes are misdemeanors 
and do not rise to the felony level of most first and second degree terroristic 
threatening laws. They may, however, represent the most appropriate charges in 
those cases where the risk does not appear all that great and the intentions of 
those who created the risk is, at best, murky. These lesser charges may point to 
the proper resolution of these cases, whatever the original charges.119 
 
114 Fieldstadt, supra note 82. 
115 Lapin, supra note 75. 
116 Rice, supra note 59. 
117 See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. §§	569.100, 569.120 (2017) (property damage); Id. §	574.010 (peace 
disturbance); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §	42.01 (West 2013) (disorderly conduct); TEX. PENAL 
CODE ANN. §	28.04 (West 1994) (reckless damage or destruction). 
118 Recall that this was the recommendation of the Model Penal Code drafters for threats that 
caused only a minor inconvenience or were the result of transitory anger. See supra note 39 and 
accompanying text.  
119 A recent Missouri terroristic threats case might provide an example of how these cases 
could be resolved. A Missouri man was charged with making a terroristic threat in the second 
degree for allegedly walking around a Walmart store in a bulletproof vest, displaying a loaded 
rifle, causing panic among the shoppers. He eventually pled guilty to the lesser charge of making 
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C.  Social Norms 
It is also hard not to underestimate the power of social norms in regulating 
behavior during the pandemic.120 Most people behave according to the 
“rules,” after all, not because of the threat of criminal sanctions, but mostly 
because they believe in the social utility of the rules. They may also behave 
according to the rules because they are the rules and believe that they are 
legitimate, even if they may disagree with some of them. The response to the 
pandemic has been, by most people and for the most part, one of rule-
following. We shelter in place, we keep our distance, we go out only when 
necessary. When we break from those norms, we expect condemnation not 
only because we know that we are putting people at risk, but, on a deeper 
level, because we do not want to break the rules or see ourselves as exceptions 
to those rules. Therefore, when Pfister and Maradiaga posted their actions on 
social media they gained notoriety, not fame. Pfister’s video was almost 
immediately brought to the attention of the police by “locals, nearby 
residents, as well as people from the Netherlands, Ireland, and the United 
Kingdom,” according to the Warrenton chief of police.121 
There are already plenty of news stories collecting Twitter responses of 
outrage and disgust against those who took the so-called “coronavirus 
challenge.”122 While the very existence of such a hashtag—
#coronraviruschallenge—suggests a widespread problem, the number of people 
taking the challenge seems small compared to those eager and ready to loudly 
denounce and criticize such behavior.123 Indeed, most references to the hashtag 
 
a false report. Jennifer Moore, Here’s How Missouri Law Defines Making a Terrorist Threat, Second 
Degree, KSMU (Aug. 9, 2019), https://www.ksmu.org/post/heres-how-missouri-law-defines-
making-terrorist-threat-second-degree#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/Z8WL-VX2A]; Armed Man 
at Missouri Walmart Pleads Guilty to Lesser Charge, AP NEWS (Nov. 1, 2019), 
https://apnews.com/55c268a3b56e4daaa1e77607fa352d6d [https://perma.cc/FG3U-B433]. 
120 See generally Natalia Mishigina et al., The Importance of New Social Norms in a COVID-19 
Outbreak, POL’Y OPTIONS POLITIQUES (Mar. 31, 2020), https://policyoptions.irpp.org/ 
magazines/march-2020/the-importance-of-new-social-norms-in-a-covid-19-outbreak/ [https://perma.cc/ 
2VKE-CNKU] (describing how preventative measures can become social norms in a way that could 
further public health goals). 
121 City of Warrenton Police Department, FACEBOOK (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.facebook.com/ 
mowarrentonpolice/posts/225199115529733? [https://perma.cc/LFZ3-DQVK]. 
122 The “challenge” involves licking a toilet seat. Alexandra Deabler, Woman Who Licked 
Toilet in ‘Coronavirus Challenge’ Talks to Dr. Phil About Bizarre Stunt, Admits She ‘Lied’, FOX NEWS 
(Mar. 28, 2020), https://www.foxnews.com/lifestyle/woman-licked-toilet-coronavirus-challenge-
dr-phil [https://perma.cc/UH3B-CEAZ] (“Initially, her ‘coronavirus challenge’ clip went viral on 
Twitter, where people demanded the woman be thrown in jail.”). 
123 Alia Slisco, Wisconsin Woman Licks Grocery Store Freezer Handle as ‘Protest to the 
Coronavirus’, NEWSWEEK (March 19, 2020), https://www.newsweek.com/wisconsin-woman-licks-
grocery-store-freezer-handle-protest-coronavirus-1493354 [https://perma.cc/JQD3-UUHU] (“Although the 
#CoronavirusChallenge hashtag did trend for a time, few followed the example of the would-be influencer 
and most activity was instead centered on either jokes or strategies to avoid spreading infection.”). 
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seem to be made in order to point out how foolish and disgusting the challenge 
is.124 One so-called influencer even embraced the title of “clout-chasing idiot” 
when her prank of licking a toilet seat won no admirers and many detractors.125 
Pfister and Maradiaga, who posted their pranks online, quickly recognized the 
error of their ways and posted apologies, also online—which was probably a 
function of social condemnation coming down so hard and so swiftly on them. 
The fact of near-universal (if not universal) social condemnation of those 
making COVID-19 threats should weigh in our consideration of what crimes 
are appropriate for those making the threats.126 If the goal is to deter future 
threats, then a large measure of that deterrence happens even before there is 
any formal criminal sanction. The backlash begins when the story is publicized 
and with that, much of the deterrence work is done.127 The criminal sanction, 
if it comes at all, comes much later when the point of maximum societal 
attention has long passed. While there is a case that Pfister and the others 
should face some punishment, it may be that to serve the social purposes of 
condemnation and deterrence, they do not need a maximum, felony-level 
punishment. The fitting punishment for those making threats may simply be 
some time in jail on a misdemeanor charge, along with the society-wide 
ridicule they face, and probably deserve, for doing such foolish things. 
To be sure, things on the ground may change. As the stay-in-place orders 
become longer, and people become restless, there may be a greater need to 
signal the seriousness of the situation and the need to follow the rules. But a 
rise in objections to stay-at-home orders are not the same as increases in 
threats to spread the COVID-19 virus. The consensus against that sort of 
behavior seems strong, even if people may be tired of staying at home and 
 
124 See, e.g., Claire Toureille, ‘Stupidity at its Best’: TikTok Star, 22, is Slammed for LICKING an 
Airplane Toilet Seat for a ‘Coronavirus Challenge’, DAILY MAIL.COM (Mar. 16, 2020, 2:21 PM), 
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-8116799/Tik-Tok-star-22-slammed-licking-toilet-seat-
claiming-complete-coronavirus-challenge.html [https://perma.cc/93QP-CNKC] (describing the online 
backlash received by a woman who filmed herself licking a toilet seat as part of the coronavirus challenge). 
125 Trace William Cowen, Coronavirus Mocker Charged with Making Terroristic Threat After 
Defiant Licking Spree at Walmart, COMPLEX (March 25, 2020), https://www.complex.com/ 
life/2020/03/coronavirus-mocker-charged-with-terrorist-threat-licking-spree-at-walmart [https://perma.cc/ 
WYM9-9XR3]; see also Trace William Cowen, TikTok User Desperate for Clout Licks Airline Toilet 
Despite COVID-19, COMPLEX  (Mar. 18, 2020), https://www.complex.com/life/2020/03/tiktok-user-
licks-airline-toilet-despite-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/9V9X-EEU7]. 
126 For a general consideration of the relationship of social norms and criminal punishment, see 
generally Chad Flanders, Shame and the Meanings of Punishment, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 609 (2006). 
127 But cf. Sepulveda, supra note 3 (quoting a director of a Consortium on Terrorism that 
terroristic threat charges may have a “deterrent effect” on “those individuals who might be doing it 
as sort of a counterculture response, some kind of joke taken too far” but not on extremist groups 
who might try to weaponize COVID-19). 
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not being able to go out to eat, or to shop, or to go back to work.128 It thus 
seems to us a kind of non-sequitur when the attorney general of New Jersey 
maintains that terroristic threatening charges are necessary to “make sure 
people abide by those orders from your governors” and “don’t .	.	. take 
advantage of their fellow citizens by engaging in criminal conduct.”129 
CONCLUSION  
The direction of our argument has been toward leniency in prosecuting 
many of the COVID-19 cases as “terroristic threats.” Our discussion of a “core 
case” was descriptive, but it also had a normative element as well: the sense 
that the core case of terroristic threatening is in fact the proper case for a 
terroristic threatening charge, even when, in other cases, “terroristic threat” 
is a possible charge. The cases we discuss in the second part of our paper seem 
to pale in comparison to the clearer case of someone phoning in a bomb 
threat. The intention to terrorize or to evacuate seems more muddled in the 
recent COVID-19 cases and the potential harm that could be caused much 
more speculative. Even the seemingly more certain fact that these people 
were reckless in how they behaved is also not entirely obvious. 
We want to be clear that we do not mean to rule out the possibility of a 
case where there was a terroristic threat in the sense of our core case. Some of 
our cases may even come close to the line where there is a core terroristic 
threat, and others that have been reported in the media may even cross the 
line.130 Moreover, it seems important to emphasize that our analysis dealt with 
cases that happened early in the response to COVID-19, when there was less 
knowledge about the virus. It will be harder for people to argue now that they 
had no idea that certain behaviors would create a risk that people would panic, 
or cause a building to be evacuated, as Pfister and his attorney are trying to 
do. It seems probable, in other words, that later cases may show a greater 
awareness of the possibility of causing terror, and an intent to cause that terror. 
Our point, therefore, should not be taken in too absolutist a way. We are 
not saying that there have not been, nor will be, cases where there is a core 
 
128 But cf. Ashton K. Dietrich, Polarization as a Predictor of Crisis Response and Juror Behavior 
During COVID-19 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors) (suggesting that the response to 
COVID-19 threats might divide along partisan lines). 
129 Jose Sepulveda, supra note 3. 
130 A more recent case from Missouri seems especially disturbing in this regard. See Morgan 
Gstalter, Police: Missouri Man Charged with Terrorist Threat for Coughing on Customers, Writing ‘COVID’ 
on Cooler Door, THE HILL (Apr. 2, 2020, 1:04 PM), https://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-
room/news/490823-missouri-man-charged-with-terrorist-threat-for-coughing-on [https://perma.cc/ 
MC68-SMK4] (explaining that a man in Missouri was charged with making a terroristic threat in the 
second degree after coughing on customers, breathing on and then writing “COVID” on the inside 
of a cooler door, and “placing his hand down his pants and then rubbing a cooler door handle”). 
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case of a threat to spread COVID-19. Nor do we argue that we should ignore 
foolish behavior when it is combined with assaultive behavior. In those cases, 
the obvious assault charges should be filed and pursued—especially if they 
involve a threat of imminent harm to police officers or to health care 
workers.131 And there also seems to be evidence that some extremist groups 
are, in fact, trying to weaponize the use of COVID-19. Obviously, threats from 
these groups would seem to lie close to the core of “terroristic threatening.”132 
We mean only to bring a note of caution to our present situation. There may 
be other, lesser charges that are adequate for many of these cases, and even if they 
can be charged as terroristic threats, this may not be the most appropriate charge, 
especially when there is a need to lessen overcrowding in prisons and jails.133 It may 
be best for states and localities to focus on the core cases, and not get distracted by 
acts that are more foolish than they are intentionally malicious.134 
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